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Abstract
The evolution of regional policy between the Mao era and the Deng era generated much
debate concerning inter-provincial disparities and the trade-off between efficiency and equity.
The aim of this paper is to explore the existence of regional growth spillover effects looked
for Deng’s policy. Indeed, the main objective was the spread of coastal provinces’ growth
onto inland provinces’ growth. After reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of such effects,
their existence is tested with panel data, for the period 1981-1998. Moreover, the hypothesis
of an equal distribution of these effects over all the inland provinces is also tested. A relative
failure to boost development of the western provinces from the coastal provinces’ growth is
observed. Hence, it would seen to be an error to wait for spillover effects to be sufficient to
reduce disparities between Chinese provinces in the short run.
JEL classification: O53, O40, R58.
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Résumé
L’évolution de la politique régionale chinoise entre la période de Mao et celle de Deng a
engendré un large débat concernant les disparités inter provinciales et le trade-off entre
efficience et équité. L’objectif de la politique initiée par Deng était que la croissance des
région côtières devait se diffuser à l’ensemble des régions intérieures. Ce papier cherche à
tester l’existence de tels effets de report. Après avoir présenté les fondements théoriques de
ces effets de report, un test sur des données régionales en panel est réalisé sur la période 1981-
1998. De plus, l’hypothèse d’une répartition uniforme de ces effets de report entre les régions
intérieures est aussi testée. On constate une absence d’effet de la croissance des régions
côtières sur les régions de l’ouest. Donc, il apparaît assez vain de compter sur ces seuls effets
de report pour réduire les disparités entre les provinces chinoises, au moins à court terme.
Mots-clés : Chine, Croissance, Régions, Effets de report, Panel.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 80’s, the regional dimension has been crucial in Chinese policy.
It is obvious that the size and the geography of the country lead to the role of the regions (or
provinces) being emphasized. The relaxation of control by the central government divested
greater responsibility to the regions. The reform also altered the relationships between the
center and the provinces. First, central government moved from the policy of control through
direct administration of the economy to one based on macro-economic management (see
Goodman and Segal, 1994). Second, the fiscal relationships between the center and the
provinces changed drastically, giving more power to the latter.
At the beginning of the Mao period, the regions were characterised by wide disparities that
the development strategy aimed to curtail. The First Plan (1953-1957) had to correct for the
supposed irrational spatial distribution of Chinese industry. Consequently, the local
authorities were encouraged to promote self-reliance. “Unlike previous Chinese governments,
the communist leadership was able to tap a powerful war-state to rectify China’s regional
imbalance” (Yang, 1997). So, one of the main goals was to reduce inter-regional imbalances.
At the same time, there was also a strong desire to enhance China’s national defence and most
of the considerations concerned military strategy. So, most investments were devoted to the
inland regions and not to the richer coastal ones. Nevertheless, at the end of this period,
coastal regions had kept their superiority in terms of infrastructure and skills.
The regional policy changed with Deng Xiao Ping, who reversed the strategy and
emphasized international trade openness and thus, the valorization of regional comparative
advantages. In order to implement this, the government chose to experiment with the “Open
Door Policy” in two provinces: Guangdong and Fujian. These two provinces had close
relations with Hong Kong, the United States and Europe even during the Mao period. TheCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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central government gave them certain advantages, especially by creating Special Economic
Zones. This policy was reinforced by the creation of 14 coastal cities which were given
preferential treatment. The objective was to promote growth in coastal regions with the idea
that there would be spillover effects between these regions and inland regions. The Sixth
(1983-1986) and Seventh (1986-1991) Plans were based on the assumption that economic
development tends to diffuse spatially through technological transfers. Even if this hypothesis
was been discussed, “the Chinese leadership has opted to favor growth at the expense of some
equity, at least in the short and intermediate run” (Yang, 1997). The international openness of
coastal regions was very important during the 80’s but inter-regional protectionism was
maintained. Hence, among others, these local trade barriers acted against the strategy of
promoting the diffusion of growth.
A main characteristic of chinese economy is the structural gap between the  coastal
provinces and the other ones. But a strong heterogeneity is also observed among the latter
and, it is usual to distinguish between central and western provinces. These ones are the
poorest, they have few infrastructures and their comparative advantage generally rests on
mining activities.
We proceed as follows: section 1 lays out the theorical underpinning of provincial spillover
effcts. Section 2 tests for the existence of growth spillover effects between coastal and inland
provinces, it also test if these effects spread equally over the non-coastal provinces. Section 4
concludes.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PROVINCIAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Provincial spillovers can result from three kinds of externalities:
(i)  demand side externalities: marginal productivity of capital depends on the
beliefs of the province’s investors about the demand in other provinces,
especially in coastal provinces which have the highest level of per capita
income.
(ii)  trade externalities: transaction costs are decreasing when trade is more
intensive, and then economic activity  in coastal regions enhances the domestic
trade in all China and consequently the growth of inland provinces.
(iii)  supply side externalities: these result from technical knowledge and the
diffusion of managerial skill. In a long term growth perspective, one may
suppose the predominance of this kind of externality.
Supply spillovers may be channelled by domestic trade between coastal and non-coastal
provinces. Technological innovations embodied in foreign capital goods (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991) diffuse to inland provinces from coastal provinces’ imports. Moreover, the
competition on the domestic market may induce inland firms to adopt the technology of
coastal firms.
Another important channel is foreign direct investments (FDI), as domestic firms imitate
technologies created by foreign firms (de Mello, 1997). With the “Open Door Policy”, the
coastal provinces, notably Guangdong and Fujian, were allowed to attract FDI and so local
firms captured some benefits (learning by doing, technological transfer, intermediate goodsCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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demand and access to foreign markets). Some firms from inland regions relocated part of their
production process to try to obtain the same benefits. It is a way to diffuse this type of
externalities from coastal to inland regions.
When a coastal province invests in an innovative project, the latter can be considered as a
free countrywide market study that improves economic information available to inland
provinces. In this way, the pioneering spirit of coastal provinces is supposed to benefit to
inland provinces.
Moreover, there must exist an imitation process of policies between provinces. It is easy to
understand why good policies may be copied (for instance the household responsibility
system, attraction of FDI). This process may be observed in many countries, but in the case of
China it has been strongly encouraged by the central government whose target was to
experiment with a policy in coastal regions and then to extend this policy to all provinces.
However, bad policies may also be contagious according to local government rent-seeking.
At last, an inland province may benefit from public capital goods provided by coastal
provinces. When a province invests in roads, telecommunications, airports and ports, other
provinces are favored, as price exclusion is not possible. The same mechanism is at work
concerning public investments in human capital, i.e. health and education. It is certainly the
case with the Special Economic Zones which concentrated the majority of investments in
infrastructure, finance, and tourism.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS
The test of provincial spillover effects is based on the estimation of a growth equation
derived from the empirical framework proposed by Barro (1991):
￿ ￿ ￿
= = =
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where the subscript i refers to the provinces, t refers to time, j, k and l denote western, central
and coastal provinces respectively. fi are specific provincial effects and eit is the error term.
The growth rate of real GDP per capita (GROWTHit) is regressed on two categories of
variables:
(i)  test variables ie provincial variables capturing spillover effects;
(ii)  control variables generally used in growth regressions across provinces in China.
We test if the coastal real GDP growth rate affects the real GDP per capita growth rate of
non-coastal provinces. Positive spillovers among coastal provinces are included. Moreover,
this method allows for spillover effects to be different across provinces.
For this, the unweighted mean of the coastal growth rate is calculated. This mean is then
multiplied by dummies which take the value one for the considered province and zero for the
others. The resulting variables are equal to the mean growth rate of coastal regions for theCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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province concerned and zero otherwise. Two groups of variables are considered according to
their geographical location: central (CENTRALitk) and western (WESTERNitj)
2.
Coastal growth may also affect coastal provinces. Thus, for each of them, we calculate
coastal growth excluding the considered province ( COASTALitl) 
3. Hence, the means are
different for each coastal province. These means are multiplied by dummies which take the
value one for the considered coastal province and zero for the others.
This work includes the usual control variables. According to the hypothesis of decreasing
rate of return, the expected impact of the logarithm of the initial real per capita GDP (GDPit)
4,
a proxy for the stock of physical capital (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), is negative. Thus,
poor provinces should grow faster to their steady state than wealthier ones (b-conditional
convergence).
Among the control variables, the international economic environment is captured by the
rate of growth of the real GDP of industrial countries (ICGROWTHt)
5. It catches an
explanatory factor whose effect is expected to be the same across provinces. The omission of
this variable may result into a simultaneous bias. A positive sign is expected.
The population (POPit) should affect economic growth positively through economies of
scale. The population growth rate (POPGRit) is a rough proxy for the reproduction rate and
                                                          
2 Central provinces are: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi and Hunan.
Western provinces are: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Shaanxi, Guizhou and Yunnan. Tibet, Ningxia and
Chongqing are exclused because of lack of data.
3 For instance, for Beijing, the coastal growth mean is calculated on the following provinces: Liaoning, Tianjin,
Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi.
4 The deflator is the provincial retail price index.
5 To catch the same effect, other variables were included in the regression such as: terms of trade, the rate of
growth of the real GDP of China’s trade partners, none appeared significant.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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so, should affect economic growth negatively, as high fertility implies an increase in the
opportunity cost of economic activity (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995).
A regional inflation rate ( INFLAit) is included to take into account the variability of
inflation across the provinces. Inflation generates distortions in the structure of relative prices
which lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. Moreover, inflation is positively
correlated to its instability and thus, increases risks for decision making. Finally, inflation
drives resources to governments and public spending may be less efficient than private
spending. So, a negative impact of inflation on GDP growth is expected (Brun, Chambas and
Combes, 1998).
The share of foreign direct investments in fixed capital investment (FDIit) is included in
the regression. A social or private productivity gap between domestic and foreign investments
may explain a positive influence of FDI on economic growth. Several mechanisms can play a
role. First, FDI promote technological transfers from industrial countries. Second, FDI may
strengthen the managerial skills of domestic firms. Third, the access to world market is easier
for Chinese products (Chen, Chang, and Zhang, 1995). Finally, FDI is a proxy for the
international openness of the provinces, which strengthens the competitiveness, extends the
market size and promotes the access to more technologically intensive intermediate goods.
State-owned enterprises are experiencing rather poor performances. The main explanation
is the lack of adaptability to market rules: redundant employees, obsolete technologies, poor
managerial skills and social and political constraints (Chen and Feng, 2000). Therefore, the
importance of state-owned enterprises  is  measured by the ratio of state-owned staff and
workers to the total number of employed persons (SOEit). It is expected to exert a negative
impact on growth.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) use different school enrollment rates as proxies for human
capital. In China, due to mandatory primary education, the most significant gaps between
provinces concern secondary and higher education. The correct denominator of these rate is
the total population of the corresponding age group. As these data are not available at a
provincial level, the school enrollment rate is calculated as the number of students enrolled in
higher education relative to the total provincial population.(EDUit) 
6
An exogenously higher value of the ratio of domestic investment to GDP (INVit) increases
the steady state level of output per capita and hence the growth rate. Investment is measured
with gross fixed investment data.
It is obvious that the positive impact of infrastructures on growth must be integrated. The
variable chosen in this paper is the length of the roads in each province (ROADit).
The data set includes 28 provinces and so 168 observations as each province is described
by 6 observation points covering the following periods: 1981-1983, 1984-1986, 1987-1989,
1990-1992, 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. The sample concerns the post-reform era, where the
growth of each province largely results from its own structural characteristics and from
decentralized policy choices. The variables are averaged over each of the five periods.
The econometric method is based on panel data technique (Islam, 1995). It allows us to
take into account some unobserved provincial heterogeneity. Two-stage least squared method
takes into account the positive impact of growth on investment.
7
                                                          
6 The school attainment variables, which record average years of  schooling, are not available.
7The ratio on investment to GDP is instrumented by the same ratio on the three preceding years, by some other
lag variables, as inflation or openness and by infrastructure variables.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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Data are taken from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New
China (Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, China
Statistics Press, 1999). The GDP growth rate of industrialized countries and the exchange
rate, to convert FDI from US dollars into Yuans, are taken from  International Financial
Statistics Yearbook 2000 (IMF).
Table 1 : Regression results
Variables Coefficients T statistic P value
GDP -0.069 4.708 0.000
ICGROWTH 0.003 1.401 0.164
POPGR -2.910 2.711 0.008
POP 5.54
E-09 2.956 0.004
INFLA -0.130 2.853 0.005
FDI 0.110 1.924 0.057
SOE -0.600 2.960 0.004
Groups of Provinces Mean of  coefficients F-test P value
WESTERN: 0 (NS) 1.280 0.270
CENTRAL: 0.54 1.980 0.050
COASTAL: 0.61 2.480 0.007
Wald test of equality of coefficients for central provinces = 0.2364 (0.988)
R ² = 0.75 R² Adjusted = 0.60 LM heteroskedasticity test = 25.8 (0.00)
Hausman test (random vs fixed effects) = 434 (0.00)
A LM test rejects the null of homoskedasticity, at less than the 1 % level, and thus the
variance-covariance matrix is corrected for heteroskedasticity. A Hausman test shows a
correlation between provincial effects and explanatory variables, so a fixed effect equation is
retained.
All the significant variables have the expected sign (table 1). More particularly, the
coefficient for initial GDP per capita is significant and negative, so, we cannot reject the
hypothesis of conditional  b-convergence between provinces. Guillaumont and BoyreauCERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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Debray (1996), Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996), Chen and Fleisher (1996) and Chen and Feng
(2000) report similar results
8. Of course, this result does not mean a trend towards a reduction
in the GDP per capita inequalities between provinces. In fact, conditional  b-convergence
leads to different provinces steady-state level per capita output. For instance, the high level of
FDI in coastal regions gives them a higher level of welfare in the long run.
The weak significance of the variable ICGROWTH   reflects the low dependence of
Chinese economic growth vis-à-vis the overall economic situation in the rest of the world.
Three additional variables are not significant (see annex 1, table 3) :
- educational variable (EDU): two main explanations may be proposed. First, the
denominator is incorrect and consequently, the differences in the age structure of the
population between the provinces, may bias the results. Secondly, only short term effects of
education are caught in the panel structure. We may suppose that positive effects only appear
over a long period, as in Chen and Feng (2000).
-  ROAD is not significant but the variable is probably  poorly chosen and better data would
have given more interesting results. Hence, we cannot draw definitive conclusions.
-  investment (INV): exogenous shifts in the investment ratio are not significant
9.
The growth of coastal provinces affects the groups of provinces considered differently.
Regarding western regions (WESTERN), the impact is non-significant. On the contrary,
coastal growth acts positively and significantly on central provinces (CENTRAL) and, a Wald
test does not reject the null that the coefficients for central provinces are equal. Moreover,
spillover effects can be observed within coastal provinces (COASTAL). This result tends to
                                                          
8 See Naughton (2001) for a discussion of these results.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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show that coastal growth benefits to inland provinces unequally. Central provinces seem to
take more advantages than western provinces from coastal development. With a different
theoretical framework (core-periphery model), and a different method (detection of spatial
correlation), Ying (2000) does not reject the hypothesis of an unequal diffusion of coastal
growth between inland provinces.
Some explanations can help our results to be understood. The first is that location and
geography matter in the diffusion of growth (Moreno and Trehan, 1997) either via
transportation costs or via monitoring costs (confidence, common knowledge) which decrease
with cultural proximity, probably correlated to geographical proximity.
The second is that some kinds of spillovers are particularly effective in cities (Glaeser,
Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 1992). The reason is due to agglomeration effects, more
present in central provinces, where there are more cities than in western provinces. Whatever
the size of the city may be, they are always much more numerous in central than in western
provinces (Batisse, Brun, Renard, 2001).
The third explanation probably comes from differences in the level of development (GDP
per capita or rate of industrialization…). The western regions do not benefit from the coastal
growth because the economic distance may reduce, even annihilate, regional spillovers.
The unequal diffusion of growth induces more regional disparities. It is, at the present
time, one of the main preoccupations of the central government with respect to potential
social and economical implications. To draw conclusions from our results, it would be
interesting to project some trends. Considering the 1998 GDP per capita and the predicted
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 For a same result, see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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value of the growth rate, income gaps between groups of provinces are estimated for the next
fifteen years.
Table 2 : Income ratio between group of provinces
Coastal/Central Coastal/Western Central/Western
1998 2.02 2.55 1.26
Projection (15 years) 2.45 3.88 1.58
As spillover effects are heterogeneous, the gap between coastal and western provinces will
be greater than between coastal and central provinces. So, the risk is to generate negative
externalities due to an extreme concentration of population and economic activities in certain
coastal places, which is at once inefficient and inequitable.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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4. Concluding remarks
The relative failure to boost the development of western provinces from coastal regions
growth or “ladder step policy”, shows that it is an illusion to hope that spillover effects may
be sufficient to reduce disparities between all Chinese provinces. Now, the challenge is
crucial for Chinese social stability and to avoid the risks of fragmentation and massive inter-
regional migrations. This observation leads the central government to give priority to public
investment in western regions in the next Five Years Plan (2001-2005). . Most of previous
investments concern infrastructure, for instance airports, highways and pipelines. The aim is
to help these provinces to profit more from their international comparative advantages.
We may think that if all the regions implement an outward looking strategy, less disparity
may be expected. But in any case, the central government will keep a crucial role through its
redistribution policy via permanent transfers.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2001.13
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ANNEX 1
Table 3 : Regression results
Variables Coefficients T statistic P value
GDP -0.066 3.940 0.000
ICGROWTH 0.002 0.657 0.513
POPGR -3.058 2.610 0.010
POP 5.93
E-09 3.372 0.001
INFLA -0.134 3.115 0.002
FDI 0.107 1.764 0.081
SOE -0.585 2.221 0.029
EDU -4.218 0.993 0.323
ROAD -2.22
E-07 0.302 1.763
INV 0.055 0.499 0.619
F test (INV+ROAD+EDU) = 0.290 (0.830)
R ² = 0.76 R² Adjusted = 0.61